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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR DISAPPOINTED BIDDERS ON
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States,
485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973)
Plaintiff, second lowest bidder for a government contract for bar-
racks rehabilitation, was denied award of the contract based on a lower
bid which had been submitted four minutes after the advertised bid
closing time.' The district court granted plaintiffs motion for a
declaratory judgment,2 holding the award "untimely, nonresponsive,
contrary to the terms of the invitation, void and of no effect."3  The
1. William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 357
F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (D. Md.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973).
2. Wilke sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1970) on the
ground that the bid was wrongfully considered. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970), provides a method for challenging the award, but does not
provide for monetary relief. A declaratory judgment, however, entitles a claimant to
sue for recovery of bid-preparation costs in the Court of Claims. See Continental
Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (CL Cl. 1971); Keco Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cf. 1970); Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States,
140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
In actions for damages allegedly incurred because of arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful
acts or omissions by an administrative agency's procurement officers, the Court of
Claims has evolved a rule that applies to all procurement situations. Requests for bids
on government contracts are made with the understanding that each bid will be fairly
and honestly considered. See cases cited supra. When a prima facie case of arbitrari-
ness or capriciousness has been established, a claimant will be allowed to present his
claims for payment. The test for arbitrariness requires the bidder to show that there
was no reasonable basis for the agency action. See Continental Business Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States, supra at 1021. Violation of a regulation, however, does not
automatically establish a bidder's right to damages: "We do not now decide that a viola-
tion of any of the regulations . . is sufficient to permit an aggrieved bidder to recover
his bid preparation costs." Id. at 1020. This obviously can make recovery more diffi-
cult, but, in a case decided by the Court of Claims shortly before Wilke, the court
granted recovery of bid preparation costs despite a determination by the General Ac-
counting Office that the contracting officer acted reasonably. McCarty Corp. v. United
States, Civil No. 282-72 (Ct. Cl., Sept. 21, 1973). For a discussion of the role of the
GAO in bid protests, see Comment, The Role of the GAO and Courts in Government
Contract "Bid Protests": An Analysis of Post-Scanwell Remedies, 1972 DUKE L.J 745.
A valuable discussion of the role of the Court of Claims can be found in Note, Gov-
ernment Contract Bid Protests: Judicial Review and the Court of Claims, 39 U. Cm. L.
REv. 814 (1972).
3. 357 F. Supp. at 995-96. The district court found that defendant had violated
the following statutes and regulations: (1) 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970), which requires
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court, however, denied the injunctive relief that would have halted the
procurement and compelled award of the contract to plaintiff.4 Plain-
tiff appealed the denial of injunctive relief while defendant argued that
a disappointed bidder has no standing to challenge an agency's bid
award practices.5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and
held: A disappointed bidder on a government contract has standing
to contest the award to another whose lower bid was late and wrong-
fully considered, but plaintiffs relief is limited to recovery of bid prep-
aration costs."
Since Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer7 bidders denied a
government contract because of alleged illegal activity on the part of
the procuring agency have been granted standings to sue for a determi-
Armed Forces procurement bids to be opened at the time and place stated in the adver-
tisement; and (2) Armed Forces Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. §§ 2.301-.305
(1974), which require: (a) that bids comply in all material respects to the invitation,
including timeliness of submission, id. § 2.301(a); (b) that they be submitted not later
than the exact time set for opening, id. § 2.302; (c) that bids received after the exact
time set for opening be considered "late bids," id. § 2.303-1; and (d) that late, hand-
carried bids not be considered, id. § 2.303-5. Defendant had contended that the lowest
bid was not late based on 32 C.F.R. § 2.402-1 (1974) which provides:
The official designated as the bid opening officer shall decide when the
time set for bid-opening has arrived, and shall so declare to those present. He
shall then personally and publicly open all bids received prior to that time, and
when practicable read them aloud to the persons present, and have the bids
recorded.
The court rejected this argument because it would grant the bid-opening officer excessive
discretion and lead to confusion in the bidding process. 357 F. Supp. at 993-94.
Defendant also claimed that the custom of reading the pre-bid opening announcement
had been relied upon by bidders in previous years to enable them to submit bids in the
bid-opening room and to have them accepted there by the bid-opening officer. How-
ever, neither party mentioned any instance where this practice had been followed. The
court therefore rejected the argument that the action of the bid-opening officer was con-
sistent with the long-standing procedures of the Baltimore District, id., and declared the
bid void. Id. at 995-96.
4. 357 F. Supp. at 995.
5. Defendant's challenge to Wilke's right to judicial review came after the appeal
was brought. Defendant, relying on Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940),
contended that Wilke had no legal interest in the agency's bid-award practices. Based
on defendant's failure to raise this issue in the district court, Wilke argued that the de-
fense had been waived. The court of appeals did not reach the waiver issue since it
found that Wilke was entitled to declaratory relief. 485 F.2d at 182 n.4.
6. William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 485
F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973).
7. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8. The doctrine that a bidder on a government contract has no standing to sue a
government agency for alleged violations of legislation regulating that agency's procure-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/4
Vol. 1974:4751 INJUNCTIE RELIEF 477
ment activities is most often attributed to Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940). There the Court dealt with a section of the Walsh-Healey Act 41 U.S.C. §
35(b) (1970), which provides:
That all persons employed by the contractor in the manufacture or furnishing
of the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment used in the performance of
the contract will be paid . . . not less than the minimum wages as determined
by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons em-
ployed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of
industries currently operating in the locality in which the materials, supplies,
articles, or equipment are to be manufactured or furnished under said contract.
Plaintiffs, prospective bidders, sought to challenge the wage determination of the Secre-
tary of Labor. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, granted
an injunction preventing Cabinet officials from proceeding under this statutory program,
and by the time the case reached the Supreme Court this injunction had been in effect
for over a year. In its decision the Court pointed out that statutes which govern the
award of government contracts are for the protection of the Government:
Courts should not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchasing agen-
cies . . . to the delays necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny at the instance
of potential sellers. . . . A like restraint applied to purchasing by private bus-
iness would be widely condemned as an intolerable business handicap. It is,
as both Congress and the courts have always recognized, essential to the even
and expeditious functioning of Government that the administration of the
purchasing machinery be unhampered.
310 U.S. at 130. The Perkins decision was perhaps an unfortunate precedent for bidders
challenging allegedly illegal contract awards. In Perkins the bidders were prospective
and therefore might never have been injured by the agency action. Also, the injunction
had already been in effect for a year and was hampering the Government's procurement
of steel during a time of pre-war mobilization. The decision, nevertheless, became au-
thority for courts to deny standing to persons challenging awards of government con-
tracts. E.g., Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962); Friend v. Lee,
221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903 (1949); cf. Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, 156 F.2d
914 (5th Cir. 1946).
The Supreme Court has stated that standing concerns the litigant's personal interest
in the outcome of the controversy; it guarantees genuine adversity in the presentation
of issues. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The original requirement for
standing was a showing that a "legal right" of the plaintiff had been violated. See L.
Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(footnote omitted) sheds some light on this legal rights doctrine:
A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort
that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable
by the courts. . . . Or standing may be based on an interest created by the
Constitution or a statute. . . . But if no comparable common law right exists
and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not
available judicially.
This original test for standing, however, could be modified by Congress by means of
an explicit statutory review provision. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S.
4 (1942) (Court interpreted § 402(b)(2) of Communications Act of 1934 as granting
judicial review to persons aggrieved or adversely affected by FCC actions); FCC v.
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nation of the validity of the agency's action.0 Even after Scanwell,
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191
F.2d 462 (1951); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). In National Coal the court explained this "person ag-
grieved" criterion as applied to challenges to administrative actions:
The "person aggrieved" review provision [is] a constitutionally valid statute
authorizing a class of "persons aggrieved" to bring suit in a Court of Appeals
to prevent alleged unlawful official action in order to vindicate the public in-
terest, although no personal substantive interest of such persons had been or
would be invaded.
191 F.2d at 465 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court in recent years has liberalized the law of standing by establishing
a standard which requires (1) that plhintiff suffer an injury in fact and (2) that the
interest to be vindicated be arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute
which the agency has allegedly violated. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Or-
ganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the majority opinion pointed out the
distinction between the old "legal interest" test of standing and the "injury in fact" test.
According to the Court, the "legal interest" test is not a test of standing at all; rather,
it looks to the merits of plaintiff's case:
The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or
"controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
Id. at 153. But the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled its decision in
Perkins, and a number of federal courts continue to regard it as binding. See note 9
infra.
It should be noted that a person has standing only if he can show that he himself
has suffered or will suffer injury, economic or otherwise. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972) (no personal injury alleged). On the other hand the requirement of
a "stake" in the controversy may have been virtually eliminated by United States v.
S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where the "personal impact" of the administrative ac-
tion was hardly different from that in Sierra Club, but the Court granted standing. It
is difficult to imagine a situation where one cannot plead around the effect of Sierra
Club.
9. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), was a
suit for a declaratory judgment to nullify an FAA contract award for instrument landing
systems. The Government again relied on Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940). The court felt this reliance was ill founded, and based its decision on two ma-
jor points: the passage of legislation altering the effect of Perkins and a private attorney
general theory. First, the court found that the Fulbright Amendment, 41 U.S.C. § 43a
(1970), to the Walsh-Healey Act shows
that the basic approach of the Supreme Court in the Perkins case has been
legislatively reversed by the Congress and [demonstrates] the Congressional
intent that certain matters arising under the Public Contracts Act will be given
specific judicial review by Congressional fiat.
424 F.2d at 867.
Some commentators have responded critically to Scanwell's reliance on the Fulbright
Amendment:
First, the court undoubtedly has over-emphasized the siguificance of the Ful-
bright Amendment. That amendment only indicates that Congress intended
to reverse the narrow holding of Perkins that wage determinations by the Sec-
retary of Labor cannot be contested in court. If Congress had intended to re-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawrevi w/vol1974/iss3/4
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however, bidders have not been successful in obtaining injunotive
relief.10 Courts have refused to grant injunctive relief on the ground
verse the basic approach of Perkins and grant standing to unsuccessful bidders,
it would have amended Revised Statute 3709 or the more recent procurement
statutes enacted in 1947 and 1949. . .. Significantly, it is these later statutes
and their implementing regulations which bidders most commonly claim have
been violated in the award of government contracts ....
Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards: Its Origins,
Rationale and Effect on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rzv. 1, 13-
14 (1970) (footnote omitted).
In addition, the Scanwell court noted that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1970), modified the law of standing:
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet chosen to hold
that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to all situations in which a party
who is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or spe-
cific statutory language, it is clearly the intent of that Act that this should be
the case. The undermining of this court's narrow construction of that statute
in the McKay case through the Hardin case and the "hospitable" view which
the Court has recently taken of construction of its provisions in Abbott Labo-
ratories leads us to believe that a decision for standing is both sound law
and in accord with the recent trend of decisions in the Supreme Court.
424 F.2d at 872.
In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 884 (1955), cited in Scanwell, the Administrative Procedure Act was con-
sidered to be merely descriptive of the law of standing at the time of its promulgation
and was not regarded as conferring any new access to judicial review. See generally
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645
(1973). For a contrary view, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 22.08, at 436-
37 (3d ed. 1972).
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), on which the Scanwell court
also relied, Mr. Justice Harlan said for the Court:
[A] survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a final agency action
by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.
id. at 140.
The Scanwell court also applied a "private attorney general" theory. 424 F.2d at 871-
73. The court referred to the following language of Judge Frank in Associated Indus.,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943):
[T]here is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any
person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy,
even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
Despite the liberalization of standing established in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and the decision in Scanwell,
not all of the federal courts have chosen to follow the principle that a disappointed bid-
der for a government contract has standing to contest an allegedly illegal award to an-
other. See Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
974 (1972); Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th
Cir. 1971); Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
10. Injunctions have been vacated in Wheelabrator ACorp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
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that an adequate remedy in the form of money damages for bid prep-
aration costs is available to the disappointed bidder in the Court of
Claims.11 Furthermore, equitable relief has always been discretionary,
and when "balancing the equities," courts have generally found that
the interests of the Government in being free from judicial interference
in its procurement operations outweigh the bidders' interests in obtain-
ing injunctive relief.1 2
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans3 articulated the criteria courts should
A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Blackhawk Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Injunctions have been de-
nied in American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1971); National
Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971); Lombard Corp. v.
Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361
(D.D.C. 1970); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), an injunction
was granted to prevent the Secretary of the Interior from canceling a pre-existing con-
tract for the purchase of helium because an environmental impact statement had not
been filed. The court attached great weight to the fact that helium, a valuable natural
resource, would be wasted if the contract were canceled. Because this factor is not pres-
ent in most suits by contractors to compel awards, National Helium is of little preceden-
tial value in such cases.
In one pre-Scanwell government contract case in which injunctive relief was granted,
the court of appeals affirmed an order of the district court compelling the Secretary of
the Interior to issue a lease to a bidder who the court held was entitled to the contract.
Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The contract involved mil-
lions of dollars, called for long-term performance, and had not been awarded at the time
of the injunction. The case is therefore distinguishable from most government contract
cases where the performance is routine and short-term, and the award to another may
have already taken place. Also, it should be noted that the court found that the Secre-
tary of the Interior did not have the discretion to waive a decision by the contracting
officer. Id. at 1119. The case thus upheld a decision by the contracting officer and
did not interfere with his authority in the procurement process.
11. For a discussion of relief available in the Court of Claims, see note 2 supra.
In M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote
omitted), the court said:
The availability of a damages remedy in the Court of Claims, which in many
cases will compensate the frustrated bidder's realized financial losses (i.e., the
bid preparation costs) resulting from the illegal agency action, provides a
sound equitable basis for the exercise of this discretion in considering whether
to entertain a suit for injunctive relief.
12. See, e.g., Serv-Air, Inc. v. Seamans, 473 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pace Co.
v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972); Keco Indus.,
Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970). It is settled that equitable discretion
may be exercised to deny relief even when a person cannot be made whole by damages
if public interest considerations so require. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937); Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion).
13. 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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consider when entertaining bidders' suits for injunctive relief. With a
view toward limiting the instances of judicial interference in the pro-
curement process, the Steinthal court stated that petitioners must first
show that there was no rational basis for the procuring agency's
actions. 14  It also recognized that even when there was a showing of
no rational basis, an "overriding public interest" may justify the denial
of the injunction. 5 In urging restraint, the court intended to allay any
fears that Scanwell might result in the judiciary's evaluating bids, apply-
ing technical regulations to complicated procurements, and interrupting
vital government functions.'8 On the other hand, the Steinthal court
also noted that recovery of bid preparation costs should not always be
considered an adequate remedy at law so as to automatically warrant
dismissal of every suit for injunctive relief.17
In holding that Wilke was not entitled to injunctive relief the
majority of the Fourth Circuit relied on Steinthal.'8 The court
assumed that recovery of bid preparation costs would adequately com-
pensate Wilke for its loss of the contract,' 9 and characterized the
Army's failure to follow its regulations as a "technical violation" of the
14. The court stated:
[C]ourts should not overturn any procurement determination unless the ag-
grieved bidder demonstrates that there was no rational basis for the agency's
decision ....
Id. at 1301. In establishing this rational basis test, the court cited Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934).
15. The court stated:
[Elven in instances where such a determination [no rational basis for the
award] is made, there is room for sound judicial discretion, in the presence
of overriding public interest considerations, to refuse to entertain declaratory
or injunctive actions in a pre-procurement context.
455 F.2d at 1301. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
16. 455 F.2d at 1301.
17. The court explicitly stated:
To avoid any confusion, it is not being stated here that the damages available
to the disappointed bidder, which do not comprehend anticipated profit, are au-
tomatically an "adequate" legal remedy as to warrant dismissal for want of
equity of every injunction action regardless of the strength of plaintiff's claim
on the merits.
Id. at 1302.
18. William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 485
F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 1973).
19. The only discussion in Wilke of the availability of relief in the Court of Claims
was the brief statement by the court that "Wilke is not denied a remedy altogether. It
may still seek recovery of bid preparation costs in the Court of Claims." Id.
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terms of the invitation for bids.20 The court also stated that the low
bidder gained no actual competitive advantage by its late submission.2
While accepting the district court's denial of injunctive relief, the
majority did not discuss whether refusal to grant the injunction after
the bid had been declared void would amount to sanctioning the unlaw-
ful award of a contract.22
The dissenting judge believed that the majority had misapplied
Steinthal.3 Judge Knapp argued that Steinthal involved an ambiguity
in the invitation for bids and that procurement regulations allow the
contracting officer to refuse all bids when he determines that such
ambiguities exist.2 4  In Wilke, on the other hand, there was no
ambiguity in the invitation and the procurement regulations prohibited
the contracting officer from varying the time for receipt.2 5 It was Judge
Knapp's belief that Steinthal only cautioned against unnecessary judi-
cial intervention; it did not preclude intervention entirely. 20 Further-
more, he distinguished Steinthal on the ground that injunctive relief for
20. Id. As far as the procurement process is concerned, regulations promulgated
to implement a statute have the same force of law as statutes. Paul v. United States,
371 U.S. 245 (1963); Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); Les-
1i6 Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U.S. 380 (1947).
21. 485 F.2d at 182.
22. See note 3 supra. In William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of
the United States, 357 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D. Md. 1973), the district court said:
In support of these requests, the Plaintiff states that it construes the Court's
decision not to enjoin the Defendants. . . from proceeding or performing the
contract work "to mean that the court sanctions the unlawful, illegal award
of a government contract. . . ." This is a total misconception by the Plain-
tiff of what the Court sought to do. The Court granted to the Plaintiff declar-
atory relief, which at least heretofore the Court understood to be one of the
objects Plaintiff sought to accomplish by this suit. The Court emphasizes that
its decision to deny Plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief, should not be taken
to mean that the Court necessarily endorses the awarding of a contract on a
bid which it has since declared void. Rather, the Court . . . did not feel on
the showing made by the Plaintiff that it should thwart the procurement pro-
cess already in train by the extraordinary remedy of injunction.
23. William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 490
F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
24. Judge Knapp stated:
The case of Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans. . . is clearly inapplicable to the facts
and the issues raised in the instant case. . . . The court found that the can-
cellation of bids was reasonable. The regulations permit the contracting of-
ficer to cancel bids if he determines that one of certain factors is present in-
cluding "inadequate or ambiguous specifications cited in the invitation."
Id. at 917-18.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. 490 F.2d at 919. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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Wilke would not interrupt a vital government function requiring hasty
action. 7
While the majority in Wilke followed Steinthal in recognizing the
discretionary nature of injunctive relief in procurement situations, it did
not discuss the criteria set forth therein. The majority failed to men-
tion the rational basis test, 8 nor did it analyze the public interest con-
siderations expressed in Steintha.29 While relying on Steinthal's
admonition against unnecessary judicial intervention in the procure-
ment process, it overlooked equally strong dicta in Steinthal suggesting
that bid preparation costs might not always be an adequate remedy3"
and that when clear violations of "ministerial" duties occur, the courts
may properly intervene. 31 Furthermore, it would appear that the
majority in Wilke understated the nature of the violation when they re-
ferred to it as a "technical violation" of the terms of the bid invitation.32
The violation went not only to the terms of the invitation, but also to
the statute and regulations which require that bids received after the
27. The dissent, in discussing Steinthal, recognized that the court there was con-
cerned with the period of time that might be taken to settle claims when contracts vital
to state functions were held in abeyance. However, the judge did not believe that the
time factor was relevant in Wilke. 490 F.2d at 918. The majority opinion did not ex-
plain why the construction contract in question required hasty action.
It appears that the dissent was more concerned with the conduct of the Government
and the lowest bidder, Gregos, after they became aware of possible court action by
Wilke.
Although the government was well aware of the pending court action, on the
very day that a hearing was set for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order the government notified Gregos of its award of the contract. Said notice
was sent by telegram. Moreover, after issuance of the temporary restraining
order by the district judge on that same day the government sent notice to
Gregos by letter. . . . This action by the Government and Gregos, coupled
with the government's weak argument that the method of closing the time for
receipt of bids was customary for the last twenty years should not be sanc-
tioned or condoned.
Id. at 918-19.
28. See note 2 supra; note 14 supra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 12 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
31. 455 F.2d at 1303. The court stated:
Only when the court concludes that there has been a clear violation of duty
by the procurement officials should it intervene in the procurement process and
proceed to a determination of the controversy on the merits. This principle,
as applied in the procurement field, would be an updated analogue of the tra-
ditional doctrine that mandamus should be issued to compel performance only
when there has been a clear violation of an official duty of what has come
to be labeled a "ministerial" duty, a duty not involving any room for discretion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
32. 485 F.2d at 182. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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exact itime set for opening not be considered.33  One might also
question the court's reliance on the argument that the low bidder
gained no advantage by his late submission; he was awarded the con-
tract based on a "void" bid.
It appears that disappointed bidders who lose government contracts
because of illegal agency action in making the award to another have
little chance to obtain injunctive relief. While judicial interference
with government procurement should be discretely applied, the discre-
tion should not become a rubber-stamp to summarily dismiss bidders'
suits for injunctions.3 4  There appear to be no compelling reasons for
courts in cases such as Wilke to deny injunctive relief when there is
no emergency procurement involved, the Government acted illegally in
making the award, the regulations do not commit the action to agency
discretion, and the interpretation of the applicable regulations does not
require any special expertise.35  Granting injunctive relief in such
limited circumstances would not obstruct the smooth functioning of
government procurement operations, would protect the integrity of the
procurement process, would guarantee compliance with legislative
mandates, and would provide an adequate remedy for truly aggrieved
bidders.
33. See note 3 supra.
34. Indeed, frivolous lawsuits can easily be terminated by the summary judgment
procedure pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56. It seems that noncolorable suits will not
overburden the courts with litigation or disrupt the procurement process, given the tre-
mendous burden of proof on petitioners to obtain relief and their poor prior record of
success. See notes 2 & 10 supra.
35. In cases denying injunctive relief or reversing the issuance of an injunction, one
or more of these criteria were absent. For cases in which there was an emergency or
high priority procurement, see Serv-Air, Inc. v. Seamans, 473 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974
(1972). For cases in which the Government did not act illegally because the matter
was committed to agency discretion, see Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1973); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971); National Cash
Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971); Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird,
318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970). For cases in which interpretation of the applicable
regulations required special expertise, see Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261
(5th Cir. 1971); Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970).
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